We define high government clarity as the dominance of one party in the executive and directly measure this by the vote share of the incumbent party. High-clarity incumbents are greatly visible and electorally successful parties. They typically owe their dominant position in government to their program's electoral appeal. These platforms prove influential abroad because they are relevant, reliable, and available precedents for parties abroad that search for electorally successful strategies. Thus, we should expect that party strategists "at home" focus disproportionately on high-clarity foreign incumbents. To illustrate this argument, consider the UK Conservative Party, which ruled in high-clarity, single-party majority governments in 1979-1990 under Margaret Thatcher. The party's visibility and re-election successes fueled a keen interest in its program by foreign party leaders and strategists who sought to position their own parties for electoral success. Saatchi and Saatchi, the campaign consultants who first successfully worked with the British Conservatives under Thatcher, for example, were subsequently employed by the Danish Con-
careful attention to the Conservatives' policy appeals. In 1983, the Conservatives' manifesto pledge to implement privatization, including privatization of the telecommunications sector, was one of the most prominent and ambitious aspects of the party's program. Thatcher's triumph at the polls in the 1983 elections enhanced the visibility and appeal of the Conservatives' programmatic stance for foreign parties in Ireland, France, Norway, and a range of other OECD countries that subsequently chose to commit to privatization. The electoral motives of parties in these countries, we argue, contributed to making the UK the origin of an OECD-wide process of policy diffusion in telecommunications privatization (Schmitt 2011, 105) .
This case illustrates a wider empirical pattern in the case-oriented literature, which suggests that manifestos of high-clarity incumbents -through their electoral success and the policies that they implement -enjoy enhanced visibility and have a disproportionate influence on the programmatic choices of election-seeking parties abroad. The implication is that other prominent examples of party policy diffusion -like diffusion from the centrist "Third Way" campaign of Bill Clinton's "New Democrats" in the first term of his presidency to Tony Blair's "New Labour" campaign in 1997, or the recent wave of populism -could gain their momentum from dominant governing parties using these policies to their electoral advantage.
Empirically, we analyze quantitative data on 26 established democracies in Europe since 1977. The results show that high-clarity incumbents are the most cross-nationally influential political parties. This finding remains robust to changes in the research design and model specifications, which we discuss in detail in the Supplementary Materials. In our conclusion, we discuss how our argument and findings inform the debates in international and comparative politics on party competition, policy diffusion in transnational politics, and the political consequences of clarity of government.
Heuristics, Government Clarity, and Party Policy Diffusion
In their search for electorally successful strategies, parties operate under electoral uncertainty and are likely to rely on heuristics to identify the most attractive programs. The platforms of dominant, high-clarity incumbents abroad offer an attractive shortcut for party strategists in judging the appeal of a party's program. They do so for three reasons.
1. When considering whether to emulate foreign incumbents, party strategists will look to the largest, electorally most successful governing parties. This makes dominant, high-clarity incumbents a relevant precedent.
2. High government clarity enables party strategists to identify and emulate those foreign parties that owe their incumbency most directly to the electoral success of their policy programs rather than coalition negotiations. This enhances the reliability of incumbency as a heuristic for judging the electoral attractiveness of these parties' platforms.
3. Dominant, high-clarity incumbents attract disproportionate media attention, which makes their platforms more available as precedents, facilitates emulation, and projects their international policy influence.
Office-seeking parties face uncertainty in the electoral process (Budge 1994, 445 ; see also Somer-Topcu 2009; and difficulties with calculating optimal electoral strategies (Laver and Sergenti 2012) . Prior scholarship provides evidence that parties use various heuristics to manage this uncertainty and to make inferences about relevant information (see Weyland 2005) .
It therefore seems likely that cognitive short cuts also apply to their choice of their electoral strategy (also Simon 1955; Tversky and Kahneman 1982a; 1982b; Kahneman and Frederick 2002; Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier 2011) . For example, parties may follow a "gradient climbing" heuristic by moving in a given policy direction if this improves their electoral outcomes as measured by vote share (Kollman, Miller, and Page 1992; Bendor, Mookherjee, and Ray 2005; Jackson 2003) . Similarly, electoral defeat leads parties to conclude that the electorate has moved away from their position under circumstances of uncertainty (Somer-Topcu 2009: 240) .
Heuristics are also likely to matter for the process that drives diffusion between party programs. The literature emphasizes learning from and emulation of policies from abroad (Dolowitz and Marsh 2000; Most and Starr 1990; Elkins and Simmons 2005; Simmons, Dobbin, and Garrett 2006; Dobbin, Simmons, and Garrett 2007; Gilardi 2010 Gilardi , 2012 . One causal pathway for policy diffusion arises when parties look to foreign incumbent parties for guidance about policies that might help them to win elections at home (Böhmelt et al. 2016) . Since strategists want their parties to win office, they are likely to focus their attention on foreign parties that assumed power.
Two types of cognitive heuristics guide parties in choosing which incumbents to emulate and learn from -the availability heuristic and the representativeness heuristic. According to Tversky and Kahneman (1982b, 164) , "a person is said to employ the availability heuristic whenever he estimates frequency or probability by the ease with which instances or associations can be brought to mind." Using the availability heuristic, a party's subjective probability of a certain policy helping it to win office will increase with the ease with which it can be recalled that foreign incumbents successfully adopted this policy as part of their winning platforms. Under the representativeness heuristic, "probabilities are evaluated by the degree to which A resembles B" Kahneman 1974, 1124) . Employing this heuristic, a party judges its chances of success are higher if its policies resemble those of foreign incumbents.
To analyze how these heuristics could influence which foreign incumbents political parties learn from and emulate, we combine the literature on party policy diffusion with that on clarity of responsibility (Powell and Whitten 1993; Whitten and Palmer 1999; Anderson 2000; Nadeau et al. 2002; Hobolt et al. 2013) . High clarity of responsibility enables voters to determine where authority over policy lies and to hold politicians accountable. Responsibility for policy outcomes is clear when features of the government itself and the wider institutional context concentrate power, rather than dispersing it. We focus on a specific aspect of clarity of responsibility, government clarity, which refers to the concentration of responsibility within a government.
This characteristic affects not only whether voters can identify responsibility for policy, but also how party strategists attribute responsibility for incumbency, in their search for electorally successful programs.
Government clarity enables party strategists to identify those foreign parties that are most electorally successful and owe their dominant position in government most directly to their program's electoral appeal. The literature identifies several government features that contribute to government clarity including the dominance of the major governing party in coalition, single party government, majority government, the government's ideological cohesion, and in semipresidential democracies, unified control of the government and presidency by the same party (Powell and Whitten 1993; Anderson 2000; Hobolt et al. 2013) . We focus on the measure that best captures a party's dominance within government -its vote share. 2 We expect that the con-2 As noted, legislative seat share and government portfolio share are alternative measures of the same concept. In the Supplementary Materials, we show that our results are robust to these alternative operationalizations of our explanatory variable centration of responsibility within a government facilitates international party policy diffusion through learning and emulation by focal parties for three related reasons.
First, high-clarity governments are those with large incumbents that govern alone or in coalition with significantly smaller, junior coalition partners (Anderson 2000, 154 ; see also Whitten and Palmer 1999; Nadeau et al. 2002; Hobolt et al. 2013) . The larger vote share of incumbent parties not only enables them to gain office in the first place, but also to dominate policymaking within a governing coalition. For party strategists, a foreign incumbent's dominance in government, as captured by its vote share, acts as a cognitive short cut in judging the electoral appeal of the incumbent's platform. The largest incumbents are those who are electorally most successful -and for a party that aims to improve its electoral success by adopting the winning strategies of incumbents abroad, the most successful of these incumbents provides the most relevant precedent.
Second, high government clarity enables party strategists to identify and emulate those parties that owe their incumbency most directly to the electoral success of their policy platforms rather than coalition negotiations. Consider the contrast between a high-clarity, single party majority government and a coalition in which power is dispersed among multiple small partners:
The majority party owes its dominant position in government directly and solely to its electoral victory. By contrast, coalition formation results from a bargaining process in which electoral performance and party size is only one parameter. In addition, coalition participation is influenced by considerations such as coalition size, that is, minimal winning status and the number of parties in the coalition (Riker 1962; Leiserson 1968) ; policy, including the ideological compatibility of the partners, the inclusion of the median party, or the presence of parties with antiestablishment views (Axelrod 1970; De Swann 1973; Laver and Schofield 1990; Budge and Keman 1990) ; the history of parties in working together (Tavits 2008 ) and institutional constraints (Strøm 1990; Strøm, Budge, and Laver 1994) . While these additional considerations play a role in the formation of all coalitions, they particularly blur the relevance of a party's platform to winning office when the electoral results produce no obvious dominant incumbent. Put differently, low clarity situations, which disperse power among multiple small parties, complicate party strategists' task of identifying how far the electoral appeal of a party's program rather than other considerations in coalition bargaining contributed to its success in winning incumbency.
This makes incumbency in a high-clarity government in which power is concentrated in a single or dominant party a more reliable short-cut in judging the electoral appeal of a party's platform than participation in low clarity coalitions. As a result, the platforms of the biggest and most dominant incumbent parties inspire more cross-national learning by parties in other systems that wish to maximize their chances of winning office.
Third, media attention to incumbents varies with the concentration of government responsibility. Not only do dominant incumbents typically receive considerably more attention than junior coalition partners (Schneider, Schönbach, and Semetko 1999; Schoenbach, de Ridder, and Lauf 2001; Semetko and Schoenbach 1999) , 3 high-clarity incumbents also receive greater attention than parties in governments that disperse power. Dominant governing parties have privileged access to "political and media resources" (Pan and Kosicki 2001, 60 ; see also Carlin, Love, and Martínez-Gallardo 2015) , which they can leverage to control the political narrative, including the framing of election campaigns. Keeping the campaign and media attention focused on the dominant incumbent's concerns and program enhances its availability as a heuristic for parties abroad. In contrast, low clarity environments, which give rise to competing framing attempts by multiple governing parties of similar weight, are likely to disperse media attention making the platform of any one incumbent a less dominant and available precedent for foreign party strategists.
In sum, for a party looking abroad, the platforms of dominant foreign incumbents in highclarity government environments are more relevant, reliable, and available precedents than the platforms of low clarity incumbents who won fewer votes and must share power to a greater degree. As result we expect that a party's dominant role within its government enhances its probability of becoming an international target of learning and emulation. Our hypothesis summarizes this expectation:
Government Clarity Hypothesis: Political parties are more likely to learn from and emulate the policy platforms of foreign incumbents that bear dominant responsibility within their governments (measured by the vote share of the incumbent party).
Research Design

Data and Dependent Variable
Our unit of analysis is the party-year, our dataset containing information on 215 political parties in 26 European democracies between 1977 and 2010 (see also Böhmelt et al. 2016 ). We Because the spatial analysis we employ requires equally spaced observations (Franzese and Hays 2007; , we interpolate scores between the election years for which the CMP data is available.
In the text, we report analyses based on interpolating under the assumption that party positions do not change until the next election year. 5
Methodology
We estimate spatio-temporal lag models (Franzese and Hays 2007; , where a party's position at time t is a function of foreign parties' positions at an earlier time e-1 and a weighting matrix specifies which subset of foreign parties exert influence. For instance, if it is believed that only foreign incumbents count, the matrix has zero entries in the row for party i except in columns corresponding to parties j that are foreign incumbents, where the entry is positive. Thus, the equation we estimate is,
where: yt is Party Position and yt-1 is its lagged value. Xt-1 is a set of controls lagged by one year discussed in detail below, year and country fixed effects, and the constant. ɛ is the error term.
Wye-1 is the product of a connectivity matrix (W) and the temporally lagged dependent variable -1997: 3.00; 1998: 3.00; 1999: 3.00; 2000: 3.00; 2001: 4.00. The appendix includes a more detailed rationale for our data structure.
lied on the 1997 Labour Party position (a 5-year lag). The average lag for all spatial lags used for the analyses is 5.34 years (standard deviation 1.68). 6 We estimate the model using time-series cross-sectional spatial OLS (S-OLS) regression, which is justifiable since explanatory variables are temporally lagged (Williams 2015; Williams and Whitten 2015; Böhmelt et al. 2016) . Recall Franzese and Hays (2008, 758) , though:
"estimating spatial-lag models by OLS yields biased estimates, even if not too badly biased if interdependence remains mild; though even then standard-error accuracy is elusive (and PCSE is no help). A simple alternative that may ease or even erase the simultaneity problems with S-OLS is to time-lag the spatial lag […] . Insofar as a time-lagged spatial lag is predetermined -that is, insofar as the interdependence is not instantaneous, where instantaneous means within an observation period, given the model -no bias arises. In other words, if spatial interdependence processes have no effect within an observational period, and if spatial and temporal dynamics are sufficiently well modeled to prevent spatial interdependence from manifesting instantaneously due to measurement or specification error, OLS with a time-lagged spatial lag regressor is an effective estimation strategy."
Considering the Adams and Somer-Topcu (2009, 832) argument that it takes time to develop party manifestos, an instantaneous diffusion effect is unlikely. Accordingly, we estimate the spa- tio-temporal lag model with a spatial lag that is temporally lagged by using party policy values from the year before the last election (the subscript e-1). Further, note that estimating spatial maximum-likelihood models instead (Franzese and Hays 2007, 163 ; see also 2008) does not affect the reported results.
Our empirical analysis also accounts for the possibility that international policy diffusion between party programs results from common exposure to similar economic (and other exogenous) factors (Franzese and Hays 2007, 142) . For example, a rich literature examines how international economic factors exert cross-national pressures that constrain government policy autonomy (Garrett 1998) , the policy alternatives available to the left (Boix 1998) , and the size and role of the welfare state (Rodrik 1998) . Following Franzese and Hays (2008) , to address this concern, we include the lagged dependent variable, party-fixed effects, and time-fixed effects. Including these items, plus a set of control variables, credibly ensures that contagion "cannot be dismissed as a mere product of a clustering in similar [party or state] characteristics," that is by common exposure (Buhaug and Gleditsch 2008, 230 ; see also Franzese and Hays 2007; Plümper and Neumayer 2010, 427) . In more detail, the lagged position of the party allows for path dependencies in policy such as those caused by inertia in policy making, year-fixed effects control for common economic shocks such as macro-economic cycles, and party fixed effects control for constant, but idiosyncratic factors affecting a party's position.
Main Explanatory Variable: Spatial Lag for Government Clarity
To capture "dominance" in the government, we rely on vote share that we incorporate in a spatial lag. This spatial lag then constitutes the main independent variable. As noted above, since it takes time to process information on other parties and to incorporate this into manifestos, each spatial lag is based on the position of a party in the year before the last election in its system before year t (see also Böhmelt et al. 2016) . Legislative seat share and government portfolio share are alternative measures of the same concept. These measures are highly correlated. A governing party's dominance in controlling vote share is typically reflected in that party's dominant control over the government's legislative seats, which in turn correlates with dominance in controlling government portfolios (Gamson 1961; Warwick and Druckman 2006) . In the Supplementary Materials, we show that our results are robust if legislative seat share and government portfolio share are used as alternative measures of our explanatory variable.
Incumbent parties with large vote shares are more visible for party strategists abroad who consider learning from and emulating successful foreign parties. In effect, their larger vote share makes these incumbent parties more dominant in the government, which facilitates government clarity (Hobolt et al. 2013, 170f) . To test the government clarity hypothesis, we use the spatial lag Wy Incumbent Vote Share defined as follows: in the row corresponding to party i, entries are 0 unless in column j the corresponding party was recently in government in another country (either forming the government on its own or as a member of a coalition) in which case the entry is party j's vote share. Data for incumbency is from Döring and Manow (2012) , and data on vote share is from the CMP (Budge et al. 2001; Klingemann et al. 2006; Volkens et al. 2015) .
On theoretical grounds that apply in our context, we do not row-standardize Wy Incumbent Vote Share (Böhmelt et al. 2016 ; see also Williams 2015 and Williams, Seki, and Whitten 2016).
Here, row standardization would imply that parties allocate a fixed amount of effort to considering other parties' positions independent of the number of such parties that might be relevant. This is not a rational approach: consideration should be given if the marginal extra information gathered has greater value than the marginal cost of obtaining it, which does not imply the allocation of a fixed amount of effort.
Control Variables
Parties conservative, Christian-democratic, and nationalist parties as "right"; and liberal parties as "centrist".
7
We further control for the position of the median voter using Eurobarometer data on respondents' left-right self-placement on a scale of 1 (left) to 10 (right) (Schmitt and Scholtz 2005) . These data cover EU member states from 1976, with additional data becoming available with the accession of new member states, and are also available for a few non-member states. 8 7 The parties belonging to remaining CMP families (namely, regional, agrarian, and other small specialized party families) are omitted. 8 We return to this in the Supplementary Materials.
We use Tukey's method (1977) to calculate the median from the individual level data, and we then lag the median by one year to allow for delayed responses by parties.
Ward, Ezrow, and Dorussen (2011) 
Empirical Results
β0 being the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable (Plümper, Troeger, and Manow 2005, 336; Plümper and Neumayer 2010, 425) . We estimate both asymptotic long-term effects and short-tern effects, and report them in Figure 1 .
Moreover, when including a spatial lag into a model, coefficients provide information about the pre-dynamic effects, that is, "the pre-[spatial] interdependence feedback impetus to outcomes from other regressors" (Hays, Kachi, and Franzese 2010, 409) . To fully understand the effect of the variables when including a spatial lag, one must estimate spatio-temporal multipliers, which allow the "expression of estimated responses of the dependent variable across all units" (Hays, Kachi, and Franzese 2010, 409) . Our initial discussion of the effects focuses on the pre-spatial effects, but we have calculated spatial long-term equilibrium effects and present them in Table 2 .
As expected by our theory, Wy Incumbent Vote Share is positively signed and statistically significant at conventional levels in Models 1-3. Substantively, a party's left-right policy position would be 0.004 points higher in the short run, if all foreign (neighboring) incumbents shift one unit to the right, compared to the year before (Ward and Gleditsch 2008, 38) . In the long run, as demonstrated with Figure 1 , the effect increases to 0.015 when the spatial lag Wy Incumbent Vote Share is raised by one unit. While these substantive results are based on Model 1, adding or dropping specific variables does not change the findings qualitatively. This also holds true when adding the domestic-level spatial lags (Table 1 Models 2-3). Notes. Table entries are coefficients; standard errors in parentheses; year and country fixed effects included in all models, but omitted from presentation; the scale for party position (dependent variable) recalibrated from the left-right estimates reported by the CMP to fit on the 1-10 median voter scale; all explanatory variables are one-year lags, the spatial lags capture parties' policy positions of the year before the last election. In the short run, these effects are: 0.004 * 17.5 = 0.07; and 0.004 * 35 = 0.14; and, in the long run, the effects increase to 0.015 * 17.5 = 0.2625; and 0.015 * 35 = 0.525, respectively.
Coming to the long-term equilibrium impacts, or the higher-order effect from the influence the policy position of i in e-1 exerts on its neighbor j in t, which in turn feeds back into the network and then influences others, including i, at time e+1 (see also Ward and Cao 2012 , 1092 -1094 , we assumed that the spatial weights and all other variables remain at 2010 values. Next, we hypothetically increase the parties' policy positions by 1 unit on a 1-10 scale. We then calculate the long-term effects on all parties, as the shock reverberates through the system of spatial and temporal lags using the following equation (Ward and Gleditsch 2008, 45) ,
where I is the identity matrix, W the sub-matrix of the i th weighting matrix for period t, and ∆Xβ is the shock at time t. Since each unit will have a different set of linkages to its neighbors, the impact of a hypothetical change in xi will depend on which unit is being changed.
Based on Model 3, Table 2 (Wy Incumbent Vote Share ) summarizes the findings from two such experiments for the impact of a one point increase in a party's policy position on the 1-10 scale in 2010 for a selected set of focal parties: the CDU/CSU (Germany) and Labour (UK). Table 2 reports the median (50 percent) equilibrium impact, based on 1,000 random draws from the multivariate normal distribution of the spatial and temporal lags. The simulations suggest that a oneunit increase shock in the UK's Labour party's policy position would positively affect all other parties in the system. For instance, the German SPD would react to this by increasing its policy position by 0.16 units to the right. Likewise, the Dutch Christian Union would move to the right by 0.17 units. Linking these findings to our theory, we find strong and robust support for the Government Clarity Hypothesis. Office-seeking parties operating under electoral uncertainty rely on heuristics, and foreign office-holders serve as an available precedent for the focal party wishing to gain office. However, not all foreign incumbents are created equal. They differ in terms of how clearly they control government (Powell and Whitten 1993; Whitten and Palmer 1999; An-derson 2000; Nadeau et al. 2002; Hobolt et al. 2013) , and we have shown that this influences their visibility abroad. For party strategists who consider emulating and learning from foreign incumbents, the evidence of a party platform's electoral success is most direct when the incumbent bears clear responsibility for winning office. Relying on the vote share of governmental parties, we find that high government clarity projects the international policy influence of incumbents.
Finally, the results concerning the control variables corroborate the findings reported in Adams and Somer-Topcu (2009), Williams (2015) , and Ward et al. (2011) . In line with the expectations expressed by Adams and Somer-Topcu (2009) and Williams (2015) , Indeed, these estimates are (unsurprisingly) close to the estimates in Williams (2015, 152) . Second, there is evidence for a significant interaction effect between economic globalization and the median voter as the estimate on the interaction coefficient indicates that the further to the right the median voter, the more globalization pushes parties' positions to the left (Ward et al. 2011) .
Conclusion
Political parties respond disproportionately to the left-right positions of dominant governing parties abroad. Existing scholarship on the clarity of responsibility has traditionally focused on accountability "at home" (Powell and Whitten 1993; Whitten and Palmer 1999; Anderson 2000; Nadeau, Niemi, and Yoshinaka 2002; Hobolt, Tilley, and Banducci 2013) . We show that government clarity has previously uncharted cross-national, and much wider, implications than generally understood. Our work also sheds new light on how leaders and strategists choose the policies that position their parties in electoral races (see Alvarez, Nagler, and Bowler 2000; Budge 1994; Budge Crewe, and Farlie 2010; Dow 2001; Erikson and Romero 1990 The heuristics applied by these decision makers identify the policy pledges of high-clarity incumbents, who have secured a dominant position in government, as the most relevant and reliable guide to electorally successful policies.
We believe that this finding has practical implications. In the policy world, the electoral strategy of emulating dominant and successful foreign incumbents rests on the assumption that parties and voters operate in information environments with some broadly defined common content. The rise of new media and the fragmentation of communication channels presents challenges not only to the party-political strategy of learning from successful incumbents abroad, but also to the informational mechanisms that underpin representation and accountability more generally.
Parties may carefully craft programs to position themselves for electoral success, but the effectiveness of that strategy will increasingly depend on their ability to communicate this position to voters by harnessing the full range of new and old media and reaching across segmented communication channels. When parties master this challenge and rise to dominance in government, our research shows that their mandate will, in turn, encourage programmatic learning by parties in other countries. The reward of a clear mandate, therefore, is not confined to domestic politics alone, but can also be expected to contribute to the creation of a more congenial international policy environment. Put differently, our work highlights that electoral mandates entail global consequences. This has important consequences for how we understand effective political repre-sentation, responsiveness, and accountability in an age of increasing international interdependence. A narrowly defined "domestic-only" view of party policy choice and competition will fail to capture this reality.
In addition, there are crucial consequences for the study of transnational policy diffusion (Elkins and Simmons 2005; Dobbin, Simmons, and Garrett 2007; Gilardi 2010 Gilardi , 2012 . While this literature primarily focuses on government-to-government public policy diffusion, we highlight the importance of an additional party-to-party channel of transnational policy diffusion. 9
Moreover, the literature on "partisan waves" (Hellwig 2001; Kayser and Peress 2012; Farrell and Newman 2017) shows that center-left or center-right party success diffuses crossnationally. Our study implies that another cross-national consequence of partisan waves is that they affect all the parties, not just those from the same party family or bloc. For example, if a social-democratic party is electorally successful, then parties abroad in general -and not only more left-wing parties -will shift to the left. Similarly, cross-national learning from successful governing parties who absorbed into their own programs at least some of the policies of populist 9 The evidence we present shows that the programs of the most obviously electorally successful, dominant incumbents are emulated extensively across borders. Together with the wellestablished finding that party positions influence public policy outputs (Kang and Powell 2010;  see also McDonald and Budge 2005; Budge et al. 2012) , this indicates that one channel for the diffusion of international public policy is programmatic learning by political parties from the platforms of highly visible incumbents abroad.
challengers can be expected to magnify the impact of the populist wave on party competition internationally. 10
Our work also holds insights for the politics of transparency. Transparency, that is, information about policy, is crucial to meaningful elections and accountable government, but the sources of transparency remain poorly understood. Focusing on the relationship between democracy and transparency, for instance, Hollyer, Rosendorff, and Vreeland (2011) argue that transparency is a consequence of democratic as opposed to non-democratic forms of government. Our results suggest that transparency cannot be attributed to the form of government alone. Among democracies, the information available to observers about the policy positions of governing parties varies and is enhanced by government clarity. This, in turn, shapes programmatic emulation.
Finally, our study leads to new opportunities to research how parties choose policies at a time of increasing cross-national interdependence. First, a core assumption of our theoretical work is that parties imitate the policy pledges of high-clarity, dominant incumbent parties abroad to compete more effectively at the domestic level. Future works could study whether this strategy is effective in electoral terms. Second, although analyzing party policy diffusion on the leftright dimension is an important first step, future research might examine the cross-national diffusion of party positions in more specific dimensions such as European integration (De Vries and
Hobolt 2012) or focus on issue salience competition strategies (Egan 2011; van Heck forthcoming) . Third, future work might explore in more depth how cross-national learning enters into the process by which political parties choose their policy positions. This requires contextual analyses 10 A related but separate question is whether newly emerging populist parties copy the example of populist parties abroad that have been successful at increasing their vote share but (typically) not at getting into office. We leave this question for future research.
of the manifesto writing process in the context of parties' organizational structures, the goals of their elites, strategists and rank-and-file party supporters (Meguid 2008; Spoon 2011; Tavits 2013) , to determine which actors within the party are responsible for copying parties in other countries. Along these lines, researchers might evaluate whether intra-party constraints condition learning and emulation (Schumacher, de Vries, and Vis 2013; Lehrer, Ezrow, Ward, and Böh-melt 2017) and affect the speed with which parties respond to foreign party policy shifts. Hierarchical political parties, in this context, may perhaps take less time to respond to outside stimuli that affect their own policies (see Ceron 2012; 2014; Greene and Haber 2016; Greene and O'Brien 2016; Lehrer 2012; Schumacher, de Vries, and Vis 2013; Schumacher and Giger 2017; Spoon and Williams 2017; Wagner and Meyer 2014) . Factional disputes could take longer to resolve when parties are organized democratically internally, and this might also affect diffusion
processes. An analysis of these factors, although outside the scope of this study, is necessary to reach a better understanding of how party policy diffusion occurs.
